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— ABSTRACT —
The turbulent changes in the Middle East which 
were seen at the very beginning as good news 
for Israel, at the end of the day became more 
ambiguous� The Arab Spring and then the war in 
Syria that had erupted along with massive social 
protests ended up with regime changes, but what 
was crucial, the primary success of the Arab 
awakening was captured by Islamist movements� 
The changes in the Middle East were even deeper 
due to at least two factors – Russia „coming into” 
and the United States „going out” of the region� 
These new regional circumstances combined 
with the geopolitical shift in the Middle East 
and a crumbling American supervision made 
Israel conclude that its security has become 
more complex and the U�S has no more been the 
only significant great power player in the region� 
Hence the difficult political and military situa-
tion around Israel has created a need to adapt to 
security challenges and simultaneously, to take 
political opportunities� 
The goal of this paper is to highlight basic 
ramifications for Israeli security and diplomacy 
— ABSTRAKT —
Dynamiczne zmiany, jakie zaszły na Bliskim 
Wschodzie, początkowo postrzegane były jako 
korzystne dla Izraela, ostatecznie jednak oka-
zały się bardziej dwuznaczne� Arabska wiosna 
i następnie wojna w Syrii, które wybuchły na fali 
wielkich protestów społecznych, doprowadziły 
do zmiany władzy, lecz kluczowym rezultatem 
było to, że zostały one przejęte przez ruchy fun-
damentalistyczne� Zmiany na Bliskim Wschodnie 
były poważniejsze i głębsze przynajmniej z dwóch 
powodów – Rosji „powracającej” na Bliski 
Wschód oraz Stanów Zjednoczonych „opusz-
czających” region� Obie te okoliczności wraz 
ze zmianami geopolitycznymi w regionie oraz 
słabnącą dominacją USA na Bliskim Wschodzie 
zmusiły Izrael do przewartościowania swojej 
polityki bezpieczeństwa� Stąd Izrael stanął przed 
szeregiem wyzwań dotyczących bezpieczeństwa, 
ale także wobec nowych okoliczności stanowią-
cych szansę na poprawę jego stanu� 
Celem artykułu jest wyjaśnienie głównych 
implikacji tych zmian dla bezpieczeństwa oraz 
polityki zagranicznej Izraela� Kluczowe pytania 
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INTRODUCTION 
Israel belongs to the countries which domestic policy and international behavior 
are determined by security matters (Kącka, 2011), likewise the Middle East 
belongs to the regions which geopolitical map only at first glance seems to be 
stable, predictable and clear� What differentiates the Middle East and increases 
its significance in world politics is the combination of intense multidimensional 
– sectarian and political – hostility, violent conflicts and ability to widespread 
instability well beyond its traditional boundaries (Bojarczyk & Bryc, 2013)� For 
the last forty years Israel has had some impact on creating balance of power in its 
neighborhood and only the recent Arab Spring has generated an earthquake in 
the Middle East status quo, reshaping it from grass-roots� Accordingly, the newly 
emergent unstable environment has created challenges and assets for Israel, but 
currently, the key factors are twofold – Russia “coming-in” and Americans to 
some extent “going-out” from the region� Since Russia’s intervention in Syria 
in 2015, the region has been perceived as one of the battlegrounds in relations 
with the West� Their rivalry has complicated all geopolitical calculations of all 
powers operating in the Middle East as well as regional players and particularly 
Israel� So, the key cards to be played in the Middle East by Washington and 
Moscow are definitely three – the future of Syria, the Iran nuclear program and 
its regional expansion, and at last – the regional strategic balance remaining in 
the state of flux� 
of the American and Russian factors in the 
current Middle East politics� The key questions 
are: How to secure Israeli interests in these new 
circumstances? How to assess, on the one hand, 
the risk of the ongoing decline of American 
interests in the region and, on the other hand, the 
complexity of the Russian strategy in the Middle 
East? Finally, whether Israel might be able to gain 
recognition by the Arab world, not to mention 
to keep its strategic domination in the region 
which is already being challenged by the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and its nuclear ambitions�
Keywords: Israel; Syria; Russia; the U�S�; the Mid-
dle East; war; conflict; security
dotyczą: możliwości zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa 
Izraela w nowych uwarunkowaniach regional-
nych; określenia, jakie ryzyko dla bezpieczeństwa 
Izraela wiąże się z osłabieniem aktywności USA 
na Bliskim Wschodzie przy jednoczesnym 
rosnącym zaangażowaniu Rosji� I wreszcie – czy 
w  takiej sytuacji Izrael zdoła doprowadzić do 
zwiększenia uznania jego państwowości w świecie 
arabskim, a także czy będzie w stanie utrzymać 
swoją dominację strategiczną w regionie podwa-
żaną przez ambicje jądrowe Iranu�
Słowa kluczowe: Izrael; Syria; Rosja; USA; Bliski 
Wschód; wojna; konflikt; bezpieczeństwo
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RUSSIA IN SYRIA: A FRIEND OR A FOE? 
Apart from the challenges created by the war, Syria has been the focus of Israeli 
attention for a  few reasons – firstly, geographic proximity; secondly, long-
standing hostility between the two countries; thirdly – in contrast to Egypt and 
Jordan – the lack of a peace treaty; and finally, Syria’s demands to recover the 
Golan Heights, taken by Israel in 1967� At present, the importance of Syria is 
definitely a function of its client relations with Iran and Russia, as well as the 
likelihood of the spillover effect across the Golan Heights� 
The war in Syria was therefore for Israel both an opportunity and a challenge� 
At the very beginning, Israelis were hoping the Alawite regime of Bashar Assad 
would be replaced by a new and moderate one, but with time the challenges 
have dominated the assessment mostly due to mounting destabilization along 
Israeli border and the risk of Syria becoming a satellite of Iran� Trying to avoid 
this worst scenario, Russia’s role in Syria was perceived by Israelis twofold: as 
a necessary complication as well as a chance to hold Iranians at bay (Bryc, 2013, 
pp� 101–102)� 
Today Syria is the main battleground among the leading regional players 
– the Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia – for their position 
in the Middle East� Simultaneously, global powers like the United States and 
the minor one but desperate to improve its international status – the Russian 
Federation – have made the war in Syria a significant part of a global agenda� 
Furthermore, most of them maintain a military presence on the ground or 
operate via proxies� There are thereby Iranian and Iranian-proxy forces in 
support of the Assad regime; Turkish ground and air forces, allegedly formed 
in the past as a part of the anti-ISIS coalition but currently used rather to deter 
Kurds, as well as American, French, British, Jordanian, Russian, and Israeli air 
forces� 
In practice, Syria is already split internally and divided into areas of for-
eign influence� Hence, the question for Israelis is, who would be able to shape 
Syria’s future and thereby the Middle East stability – Americans, Russians, or 
someone else? Definitely the importance of the U�S� in the region is doubtless 
for them, however the future of American impact on the region remains vague� 
In contrast to the full-scale engagement in the past in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
American absence in the war in Syria is being so striking� Not surprisingly, in 
Israeli assessments, it is Russia and its military success in Syria that has shaped 
significantly new ramifications for Israel’s security policy (Dekel & Magen, 2015)� 
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Russia’s decision to use force in Syria in September 2015 stemmed from 
several considerations� First of all, military support for Assad has challenged 
the United States, whose position and impact on the regional balance of power 
is believed to be reduced� Challenging the American interests in the Middle 
East may help Russia to exploit its influence in Damascus and bargain more 
successfully with Washington after their relations became frozen as a result 
of the Russian annexation of Crimean Peninsula in 2014� Being aware of the 
long history of Russian-Syrian cooperation and the Kremlin’s strategic interests 
there, Israel realizes that Russia’s actions in Syria are aimed at, firstly, keeping 
the bastion of its influence in the region; secondly, recovering previously lost 
influence in the Arab world; thirdly, expanding with military facilities outside 
post-Soviet area; lastly, keeping a market for arms sales and finally filling each 
vacuum created by a limited activity of Americans in the region� 
In spite of the complex situation due to Syrian war, Israel and Russia have 
been trying to keep pragmatic bilateral relations, mostly in terms of security� Nev-
ertheless, the deployment of Russian S-400 ground-to-air missiles in northern 
Syria has challenged Israel by virtue of limiting the Israeli Air Force’s freedom of 
action and secrecy because S-400 system covers extensive areas in Syria, Lebanon, 
and northern Israel� From the new position at Lakatia on the Syrian coast, the 
range encompasses half of Israel’s airspace, including Ben Gurion International 
Airport (Gross, 2015)� 
So Russian military and political presence in Syria combined with Israel’s 
interest to deter any terrorist group (Hezbollah) or Shia militias from entering 
the Golan Heights motivated both countries to find a channel of communication 
and operational coordination to avoid any confrontation� Such a “deconfliction 
mechanism” has been operating at multiple levels� Nevertheless, it is always 
a matter of time until something happens� The first such deep crisis broke out in 
September 2018 as Syrians downed, instead of Israeli jet, the Russian airplane� 
The Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed immediately his sorrows but 
reaction of the Kremlin was acute� Although Putin did not decide to downgrade 
bilateral relations, he ordered to transfer to Syria advanced S-300 ground-to-air 
missiles systems that might challenge any air operation of Israeli air forces� Such 
systems (S-400) were being operated in Syria, though they were only being used 
by the Russians and not being employed against Israel, so far� Now, however 
Israelis declare that in their opinion both countries still have a fundamental 
interest in continuing good relations and maintaining their understandings in 
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Syria, the risk of Russia repaying Israel with the same is more serious� And the 
last Netanyahu wants now is a confrontation with Russia� 
Paradoxically, the key challenge for Israelis is not a military but a political 
one� Undoubtedly, the Israeli government is deeply disturbed by the Russian 
assistance extended to the Iranian-led Shiite axis in Syria and by cooperation 
with Iran as well� Israelis suspect that Russians are training Hezbollah how 
a world-class army gathers intelligence, makes plans, and executes operations� 
Israelis are also warning that, by working side-by-side with Russian officers, 
Hezbollah is likely to refine a modern military strategy that would make Israeli 
military specialists reassess the capacity of Nasrallah’s group� Consequently, 
a newly offensive-minded Hezbollah capable of more complex operations could 
deal heavier blows to the Israeli army in a clash along the southern Lebanese 
border� It may even attempt to enter Israeli territory, as Hamas did in the 2014 
conflict, albeit in a more capable manner (Allouche, 2016)� 
Although it is not difficult to see Russia’s motivations for supplying Hezbollah 
with weapons, many specialists doubt this� According to Eyal Zisser, a professor 
at the University of Tel Aviv, “The Russians are careful not to engage directly 
with Hezbollah� Russia’s message to the Israelis is quite clear – as long as you do 
not sabotage our efforts in Syria you are free to do with Hezbollah whatever you 
want” (Cohen, 2016)� On the other hand, not all Israeli analysts dismiss the story� 
Yiftah Shapir, the head of the Middle East Military Balance project at Israel’s 
Institute of National Security Studies, does not believe that Russia would openly 
sell P-800 Yakhont cruise missiles and Buk surface-to-air missiles (SA-17) to 
Hezbollah – the main threats as far as Israel is concerned� However, he believes 
that Hezbollah is resupplied with Soviet-origin weaponry – artillery shells for 
guns, artillery rockets for MRLs and anti-tank missiles (Cohen, 2016)� 
An ostensible support of Hezbollah and open backing of Iran and Syrian 
President al-Assad are presenting Russia as a reliable ally in the Middle East, 
which does not change much in the region now, but in the long term may allow 
Russia to rebuild its wider presence in the Arab Peninsula and successfully 
weaken Americans in the region� Thanks to Russia’s loyalty and decisive opera-
tions in Syria, it sends a clear message to Arabs that, unlike the United States, 
Russia indeed supports its allies and does not betray them (Trenin, 2018, pp� 
86–112)� This has also ramifications for Israel, because the question is not only 
whether Russia is coming back to the region, but more importantly, who will be 
the Kremlin’s ally – Iran, Turkey, moderate Arabs, or Israel? 
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Looking back to Russian allies in the Middle East so far, the Jewish state 
has been challenged by the Russian-Iranian cooperation, particularly by Russia’s 
role in developing Iran’s nuclear program� Israelis are worried about Tehran’s 
ongoing efforts to arm itself with nuclear weapon, develop its missile program 
and generate a military presence on Israel’s borders with Syria and Lebanon� 
The final success would mean for Israelis the end of its strategic superiority in 
the region and neutralization of its defense and deterrence capabilities� Seen 
from Moscow, the alliance with Iran is one of the most useful cards to play 
in the game in the Middle East, but undoubtedly their bilateral relations are 
overshadowed by a long tradition of mutual fear and suspicion� Therefore, their 
cooperation is definitely broad, but much more of tactical importance� Kremlin’s 
choice is based on the recognition of Iran’s growing importance as a regional 
power, which, along with hostile Iranian-American and Iranian-Israeli relations, 
is giving Russia many tactical possibilities in front of the U�S�, Israel and the 
Arab countries (Moore, 2014, pp� 47–65)� What is more, it would help Russia 
to erase the label of a junior partner in relations with the United States� In fact, 
Russian leaders have no illusions about the nature of the Iranian policy and 
they realize the danger of proliferation in the world’s still most combustible 
region, but all these concerns are part of the more comprehensive concept of 
Russian international strategy� Russia’s backing of Iran is neither unconditional 
nor unambiguous, so consequently to keep the balance, Russia has supported 
a few UN Security Council resolutions on Iran, three of which imposed light 
sanctions on that country, and was part of the P5+1 (alongside with the other 
four permanent members of the Security Council and Germany) group that had 
negotiated the nuclear deal with the Iran (Trenin, 2010, p� 14)� Certainly, Russia, 
like the rest of the world, does not want Iran to develop nuclear weapons, but 
it is not interested in waging a preemptive war against Iran, like the U�S� did 
in Iraq� For these reasons it condemned Trump’s threats to withdraw from the 
2015 landmark deal with Iran that aims to curb Tehran’s nuclear program in 
exchange for lifting sanctions� As the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey 
Lavrov argued, such reckless policy of the American administration could end 
up with international destabilization or even more unpredictable consequences 
(Lavrov, 2017)� 
What Israel can do in this case is to count on the competing interests of 
Moscow and Tehran in the Middle East and the broader international scene 
and try to attract Russia in security matters (Bryc, 2017, pp� 85–95)� Such think-
ing does make sense, because even in Syria there is much room for Russian-
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Iranian rivalry� Their views on the future of Syria are the first but not last bone 
of contention� While from Iran’s perspective Assad’s survival is of substantial 
importance – since any regime that could take its place would be much less 
convenient for Iran – from Russia’s perspective the Assad regime is important 
but not critical� This means that the Kremlin is in fact ready to negotiate with 
the U�S� some compensations in Syria in return for the lifting of economic sanc-
tions that followed its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and a recognition of Russia 
as a significant global player (Piechowiak-Lamparska, 2019)� The next area of 
potential dispute between Russia and Iran is the future dependence of Syria� 
While Russians have dominated the diplomatic and political backing of Syria 
in international politics, they had to share the military campaign with Tehran, 
which has helped Iran to expand its influence into Syria with the perspective of 
creating a broader political, military and logistics land-bridge between Iran, Iraq, 
Syria and Lebanon� So the question of who will dominate the Syrian regime – 
Russians or Iranians – would be a room for rivalry between these both powers� 
Another reason for potential dispute between Russia and Iran is the future of 
Syrian Kurds� Iran is closely watching Russian and American military relations 
with the Syrian Kurdish nationalist Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the 
Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG)� While Iran has worked with the PYD 
and Russia to back Assad’s forces, given its own increasingly volatile problems 
with Kurdish separatist groups, Tehran has rejected federalism in northern Syria 
(Geranmayeh & Liik, 2016, p� 6)� 
The Kurdish card is played by Russia not only in front of Iran, but mainly in 
relations with Turkey� Nevertheless, today Russian-Turkish relations seem to have 
reconciled after the freeze caused by the downing of a Russian jet by the Turkish 
air force on November 24, 2015� The fact is, there is by all means more rivalry 
than cooperation between Russia and Turkey� Firstly, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and 
Vladimir Putin represent aggressive and ambitious leaders driven by the desire 
to transform their respective countries into the powers they once were� It is no 
accident that their nicknames are “sultan” for Erdogan, and “tsar” for Putin� Even 
if current Russian-Turkish relations are pragmatically warm, there is not enough 
space in the Middle East and in the post-Soviet sphere for such ambitious leaders, 
and one day their interests are likely to clash once again� Secondly, regarding 
the Syrian crisis, they occupy the opposite positions in terms of Assad’s removal 
from power and the role of Kurds in the Syrian conflict� Furthermore, while both 
countries formally had opposed the Islamic State and declared to weaken it, they 
were actually making use of it to garner legitimacy for their activities in Syria� 
14 ATHENAEUM
Polish Political Science Studies
vol. 64(4)/2019
However, a variety of future scenarios in the Turkish-Russian confrontation 
are still possible, and the fact is that the stability in Syria is rather not possible 
without the mutual cooperation of Ankara and Moscow� 
So, what are Israel’s options for Russia in Syria? Choosing among bad and 
worse options – Bashar Assad’s survival with Russian patronage in Syria or 
Iranian presence vide their proxies operating in close neighborhood with Israel 
– the calculation is quite clear in favor of adopting for Russians behind the 
borders� This is why the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has officially called 
on President Putin to follow a few demands or otherwise Israel will successfully 
hit any peace attempts by military involvement in Syria� Firstly, Israeli interests 
have to be taken into consideration during peace talks sponsored by Russia and 
Israel must be, even covertly, involved in these negotiations� Secondly, Russia – 
not Iran – should take responsibility for security in Syria� Thirdly, Israel will not 
accept any Iranian infrastructures for manufacturing, assembling, and storing 
advanced weapons anywhere in Syria� Lastly, Israel will not allow for Russian 
or Iranian arms transfers to Hezbollah or Shia militia in Syria (Dekel & Magen, 
2017)� 
It is no wonder that when an Iranian drone was intercepted in Israeli airspace 
in February 2018, Israelis decided to respond militarily and strike targets in 
Syria� Despite the precise military operation, for the first time since the first 
Lebanese war in the 1980 the Israeli jet was brought down by anti-aircraft� This 
incident was definitely a mutual Israeli-Iranian exchange of messages that, on the 
one hand, Israel is ready to intervene and risk a full-scale conflict in Syria with 
Iranian forces and their allies, including Hezbollah if they would dig in on Syrian 
territory and approach the boundary with the Israeli-held portion of the Golan 
Heights� On the other hand, bringing down F-16 was a clear signal to Israel that 
the next such operation should be assessed as of a high risk and the capabilities 
of Iran in Syria must be taken as operative� 
All in all, Israel took a few lessons from this accident� First of all, Iran has 
demonstrated its military capacity, what suggests that in the case of any Israeli 
intervention in its sphere of responsibility, Iran will respond� The scenario of 
a conflict with Hezbollah, which thanks to its involvement in Syrian war is now 
more experienced, better equipped and well trained, seems to be more likely� 
Hence, Israel should take into consideration a broader clash in the northern 
front of Golan Heights with the Iranian proxies in Syria and in southern Leba-
non with Hezbollah� To make it more complex, the alternative of the conflict in 
the northern front is burdened by the risk of drawing Russia into the regional 
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confrontation� Therefore, the next conclusion is that Israel could not restrain Iran 
alone and any military scenario must consider not only the Russian factor and 
the assessment of how long Moscow could remain neutral but first of all whether 
the American administration would grant their permission being aware of the 
likelihood of a confrontation with Russia (Shapiro, 2018)� 
TRUMP FACTOR 
The U�S� support is fundamental for Israel for the variety of reasons� The key 
factors are however the military and financial aid allowing Israel to keep the 
“qualitative military edge” (QME) over neighboring militaries, international 
backing which successfully neutralizes anti-Israeli resolutions in the United 
Nations, not to mention deeper mutual understanding and shared values 
(Sharp, 2018)� Nevertheless, the U�S�-Israel special relationship used to be far 
from perfect� And the case was not only Barack Obama’s presidency when some 
of the underlying foundations of this special alliance were challenged by more 
critical attitude towards Israel regarding to settlements’ policy in the West Bank 
or the peace process in deadlock� Also, what was crucial for the Prime Minister 
Netanyahu – the diplomatic opening with Iran, an initiative that would end three 
decades of Iranian-American hostility in return for depriving Israel its strategic 
superiority in the Middle East (Katzman, 2016, pp� 65–94)� 
Not surprisingly, Netanyahu’s government had been seriously concerned 
about the Israeli-American alliance under Barak Obama� It was in particular 
the rapprochement between the U�S� and Iran that was recognized as directly 
touching Israel’s security and strengthening the risk of the U�S� abandoning its 
strategic ally (Jervis, 2017, pp� 31–57)� Hence, it was ironic that it was Barak 
Obama, whose contact with the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was 
notoriously cold, to sign the largest in the U�S� history a 10-year agreement of 
$38 billion deal for military aid to Israel (Booth & Eglash, 2016)� Politically, such 
a huge package was partly a response to the nuclear deal that the United States 
and other P5+1 powers had finalized in July 2015, and it was harshly criticized 
by Netanyahu, who called it a “historic mistake” that would ease sanctions on 
Iran while leaving it with the ability to get the bomb one day, and the new money 
was an attempt to pacify Israeli concerns about continuing threats from Iran 
(Green, 2016)� 
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Fortunately for Benjamin Netanyahu, Donald Trump has been sharing his 
antipathy for the Vienna deal, even as it sets them apart from the overwhelming 
majority of other world leaders� In line with the Israeli Prime Minister’s stance, 
the American President firstly signaled his intention to withdraw certification of 
the Iran deal and then finally took the step� Although that does not lead directly 
to the end of the agreement, but it allowed to restore sanctions on Iran� In fact, 
Israel has little if any chances to stop Iranian nuclear deal, so Benjamin Netan-
yahu has to understand and appreciate his limitations and the tiny likelihood of 
stopping Iranian nuclear system by using primarily military solutions instead of 
diplomatic and political ones (Landau & Stein, 2015)� 
The Trump’s staff responsible for the Middle East dominated by hawks and 
critics of the Iran deal as well as supporters for sanctions and preemptive attacks 
suggests that the American policy in the Middle East is likely more pro-Israeli 
and anti-Iranian than in the past� It is not surprising as President’s Trump elec-
torate is Christian and for biblical reasons pro-Israeli� They believe that creation 
of the Israel as a Jewish State was the fulfillment of biblical prophecy� This way the 
Israeli-American alliance is not only the result of political calculations and shared 
interests, but comes from more spiritual political philosophy� Consequently, there 
are numerous pro-Israeli politicians in the White House like Jared Kushner, the 
President’s son-in-law leading the diplomatic effort in working on a proposal 
of a new Middle Eastern peace agreement, Jason Greenblatt, a special envoy 
to the Palestinian-Israeli peace process (till September 2019), and Nikki Haley, 
the U�S� envoy to the UN (till the end of 2018)� In the very beginning, President 
Trump nominated David M� Friedman, a lawyer aligned with the Israeli far right, 
as an ambassador to Israel� Pro-Israeli were also John Bolton, a security advisor, 
and Mike Pompeo, the former director of CIA who replaced Rex Tillerson as 
the Secretary of State� 
Coming to evangelical Christians’ expectations, President Trump took the 
decision on moving the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem already 
in 2018 to make it coincide with the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the 
State of Israel planed for the 14th of May� The decision came despite overwhelm-
ing global opposition, not only the Palestinian one and the most of Muslim 
world, but it was in contrast to previous political consensus of all presidents so 
far� Putting aside the fact that the movement of the embassy to Jerusalem will 
not change anything on the ground, as for Israelis Jerusalem is their capital city, 
as well as Palestinians will not give up their claims for the East Jerusalem as their 
capital city� 
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All in all, this would bring to at least two consequences� Firstly, it is widely 
feared that moving it to the Holy City for Jews, Christians and Muslims will fuel 
anti-Jewish radicalism in the Muslim world if not spark anti-Israeli violence in 
the region� Secondly, it will push back already waning efforts to achieve peace 
between Israel and the Palestinians� Despite these worries the majority of the 
Israeli analysts has welcomed this decision� Some of them even doubt whether 
Palestinians and other Arab nations would carry out massive upheavals� For 
instance, Elliott Abrams, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council 
on Foreign Relations (CFR) in Washington, DC and Former Deputy Assistant 
to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor in the administration 
of President George W� Bush, claims that violence depends only on Arab lead-
ers and if Palestinians want peace, they will negotiate for peace – wherever the 
U�S� embassy sits (Tzogopoulos, 2017)� 
There are justified worries, however� American politics in the Middle East 
being so favorable to Israel might force the Jewish State to face more security 
challenges than opportunities� First of all, recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital 
by moving the American embassy there from Tel Aviv disgraces the Palestinian 
authorities and primarily President Mahmoud Abbas, who turns out to lose his 
face in front of the Palestinian people and remain helpless in this situation� The 
problem for Israel is indeed not a weakening position of Abbas, but the risk of 
long-lasting, non-violent resistance of Palestinians both in the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank to which Israeli security forces are definitely not prepared� The logic 
is quite clear, as long as violence is on the Palestinian side, the Israelis will legally 
respond with force, but a non-violence may challenge Israel because it will likely 
help Palestinians to gain more international support and weaken their deeply 
ingrained image of terrorists and extremists� As a result, the more successful the 
non-violence is, the less successful is the Israeli campaign against a worldwide 
international criticism (Hussein, 2015, pp� 143–160)� 
Another potential threat for Israel is a  risk of a  new hybrid war� The 
U�S� politics in the Middle East bias towards Israel will likely fuel all grass-roots 
anti-Jewish sentiments in the region� Contrary to the conventional threat, the 
challenge would be the asymmetrical conflict against those with both guerilla 
and regular capabilities like Hezbollah and Hamas� These organizations could 
not be perceived any more as typical irregular militias based on spontaneous 
supporters due to the long-lasting experience of Hezbollah in Syria or Hamas in 
three mini-wars with Israel, more professionalism thanks to an advanced military 
training delivered by high professionals (Russians and Iranians for Hezbollah), 
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financing from abroad, better equipment and improvement of logistic skills 
(Davis, 2016, pp� 68–72)� While none of them is interested in a direct clash with 
Israeli, it is predicted however that a potential conflict cannot be excluded in 
south of Lebanon, the Gaza Strip and most of Israel’s parts, according to the 
range and location of Hezbollah or Hamas rockets and missiles regardless of 
the capabilities of the Israeli anti-rocket system intercepting missiles in the air 
(Eilam, 2016, pp� 247, 254)� 
Hamas has been governing Gaza since 2007 and for more than ten years 
it has been in charge of managing the public security, health system and 
administration� Within a decade Gaza’s two million residents have suffered 
from poor humanitarian conditions, high unemployment (44 percent), pov-
erty (40 percent), not to mention the lack of reconstruction after wars with 
Israel (Palestine’s Economic Outlook, 2017)� Struggling with the fallout from an 
Israeli-Egyptian border blockade since 2007, Hamas has found it increasingly 
difficult to govern or provide basic services to Gaza’s residents� So, the very last 
reconciliation agreement that Hamas and Fatah signed in Cairo in October 2017 
has been giving Hamas some political benefits� However, its implementation 
is still questionable and quite likely may end up like the previous attempts� 
Nevertheless, the handover of Gaza administrative control to the Palestinian 
unity government will allow Hamas to saddle all costs and responsibility of 
governing Gaza with Mahmoud Abbas’ administration especially as he started 
pushing Hamas to return the territory to the PA’s control by refusing to pay for 
Gaza electricity, administration salaries and public health� This is why Hamas 
– eager to rid itself of the burdens of governing, though unwilling to disarm its 
military wing – showed flexibility at the talks� The calculation is clear, public 
and administration will become the responsibility of Fatah whereas security 
and resistance of Hamas� Moreover, the process of reconciliation might help 
Hamas to weaken the position of President Abbas, who is now suffering from 
a general criticism in the West Bank for lack of success in attempts to negotiate 
the terms of Palestinian statehood with Israel, no legacy and chronic corruption� 
Simultaneously, it helps him to strengthen Abbas’ rival Mohammad Dahlan, the 
ousted Gaza leader of the Palestinian Fatah movement, who lives in exile in the 
United Arab Emirates� Hamas is hoping that an alliance with Dahlan would 
persuade some Arab countries to provide financial aid to the Palestinians in 
the Gaza Strip� Finally, Hamas does not want to be the party responsible for 
the reconciliation’s failure lest this undermines its relationship with Egypt as 
its position has been weakened by recent developments in the region, includ-
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ing Saudi-led moves against Qatar, once a major financial contributor to Gaza 
(Haaretz & Reuters, 2018)� 
Despite its weakness and reconciliation process with Fatah, Hamas realizes 
that at a time when the entire Arab world is fighting the U�S� President Donald 
Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, it cannot remain 
on the sidelines� Thus, it is trying to show that it is actively opposing Trump’s 
announcement by, inter alia, organizing “The March of Return” in Gaza, a return 
not to the peace process, which Hamas rejects out of hand, or to the pre-1967 
boundaries, which it refuses to recognize, but to 1948, the year of setting up 
Israel (Chafets, 2018)� The “March of Return” has unveiled a new tactic, mass 
swarming, designed to force Israeli troops at the border, provoke to use force and, 
at the end of the day, the international condemnation� It seems, however, not to 
work so successfully� Meanwhile, the lesson for Israel is that it should improve 
its capabilities in case of such not-so-violent “marches” and “days of rage” but 
very provocative and aiming rather at gaining the mass-media attention and 
international societies’ hearts and minds� 
The U�S� pro-Israeli decisions are creating, among many challenges, also 
opportunities for the Israeli government� More precisely, although the decision 
of moving the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem would reverse decades of the 
U�S� policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and undermine Washington’s role 
as a broker in the peace process, the undoubted advantage is that Israel’s relation 
with some Arab countries, mostly the Persian Gulf monarchies and mainly Saudi 
Arabia, has become no more so-covert-alliance as well as no more a taboo� Such 
a shift may bring a broader, however, still limited pragmatization of contacts with 
the Arab countries based on mutual interests, like, first of all, confrontation with 
Iran by exchanging intelligence with the Saudis� What is important for Israel, 
Saudis and Qataris play a significant role in the Palestinian conflict, which is 
for now fairly low on the agenda of the Middle East in turmoil, but in case of 
restarting the peace process it would be crucial to limit the Arab monarchies 
involvement onto the talks or at least their critical reaction to the “ultimate deal” 
which President Trump promised to make between Israelis and Palestinians� 
The image of the U�S� as solely pro-Israeli ally is one thing, practical strategy 
is quite another� Although many of Trump’s words may be welcome in Israel 
and Saudi Arabia, both governments know that the U�S� policy seems adrift in 
the region� The declining role of Americans in the Middle East since Obama’s 
presidency has created a more complex situation of Israel and encouraged the 
local players retained greater ability to determine regional politics on their own� 
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As a result, historical grievances, geopolitical rivalries and ideological clashes, 
which never disappeared from the agenda, are able to manifest themselves more 
freely than before, and here it is enough to point a virulent competition for 
regional hegemony between Saudi Arabia and Iran which is able to destabilize 
entirely the region (Istomin, 2016, p� 4)� 
The lesson for Israel is – in spite of the ongoing alliance with the U�S� – to be 
more self-reliant in terms of security in the Middle East� President Trump’s deci-
sions may harm Israel in the long run, like by stating in Ohio in March 29, 2018 
that the American forces will be pulled out of Syria “very soon”� The problem is 
not the sole declaration but the following words “Let the other people take care of 
it now” (Merica, Liptak, & Diamond, 2018), which suggests that Syria will likely 
become either Russia’s “protectorate” or Iran’s� Such declarations are concerning 
Israel and other regional nations like at least Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon 
as being the most impacted by the war in Syria� From their perspective, the 
U�S� military presence in Syria has been seen as a buffer against Iranian activity, 
and especially against Tehran’s desire to establish a contiguous land route from 
Iran to the Mediterranean coast in Lebanon� 
IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION 
The Arab Spring and the following war in Syria have transformed the regional 
politics as well as shifted the balance of power� First of all, it has highlighted 
declining interest of the United States in the region and simultaneously elevated 
regional states like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and the newcomers like Russia� 
Consequently, the political vacuum created by a limited activity of the Americans 
has been filled to some extent by Russians taking any opportunity to find and 
use the leverage to bargain with the U�S� in other regions� 
The Arab Spring, seen from Israel, was a chance to topple the regime of Bashar 
Assad and install in Damascus more moderate government� These hopes became 
soon pointless due to capturing the success of the Arab Spring by Islamic funda-
mentalists and particularly Iran� So, once again it turned out that in the Middle 
East things are not always what they seem to be� 
Moreover, Moscow, at first glance seen as an acceptable partner in the Middle 
East, is in fact much more a risky one� Its interests are more global than Israeli 
ones and the Middle East is not a priority for Russia, as it is rather an instrument 
of leverage in front of the United States� So, President Putin, who is recognized 
21Agnieszka Bryc :  A “New” Middle East? Implications for Israel’s Security 
rightly as pro-Israeli, might easily maneuver between Israel, Iran, Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia and Israel to achieve Russia’s interests� If in Kremlin’s strategy would be 
a rapprochement with Tehran, Moscow will not hesitate to act in favor of Iran� 
Nevertheless, the paradox and at the same time the room for Israel is that Russia’s 
position in the Middle East is neither so stable, nor so crucial� In fact, Americans 
who are seen as abandoning the region cannot disengage from the Middle East 
completely and are able – if needed – to limit Russian inroads to the region� 
Finally, however the regional political circumstances have been changed 
dramatically, the task for Israeli security has not been changed so much and 
remains focused on not-so-new two assumptions – to rely first of all on itself in 
terms of defense and to keep the U�S� involved and focused into the Middle East� 
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